















Abstract$ What$ are$ economic$ exchanges?$ The$ received$ view$ has$ it$ that$
exchanges$are$mutual$transfers$of$goods$motivated$by$inverse$valuations$thereof.$As$
a$ corollary,$ the$ standard$ approach$ treats$ exchanges$ of$ services$ as$ a$ subspecies$ of$
exchanges$of$goods.$We$raise$two$objections$against$this$standard$approach.$First,$it$
is$ incomplete,$ as$ it$ fails$ to$ take$ into$ account,$ among$ other$ things,$ the$ offers$ and$
acceptances$that$lie$at$the$core$of$even$the$simplest$cases$of$exchanges.$Second,$it$
ultimately$ fails$ to$ generalize$ to$ exchanges$ of$ services,$ in$ which$ neither$ inverse$
preferences$nor$mutual$transfers$hold$true.$!
We$propose$ an$ alternative$ definition$ of$ exchanges,$which$ treats$ exchanges$ of$
goods$ as$ a$ special$ case$ of$ exchanges$ of$ services$ and$ which$ builds$ in$ offers$ and$
acceptances.$According$to$this$theory:$(i)$The$valuations$motivating$exchanges$are$
propositional$and$convergent$rather$than$objectual$and$inverse;$(ii)$All$exchanges$of$









2001,$ p.$ 27F321).$ Given$ the$ centrality$ of$ the$ concept$ of$ exchange$ in$ economics,$ it$ is$
surprising$ how$ little$ attention$ has$ been$ paid$ to$ the$ nature$ of$ exchanges.$ Economists$
have$ extensively$ studied$ the$ conditions$ in$ which$ exchanges$ occur$ and$ the$ role$ that$
exchanges$ play$ in$ the$ determination$ of$ prices$ and$ equilibria.$ In$ collaboration$ with$
philosophers,$they$have$assessed$various$normative$issues$pertaining$to$exchanges,$such$
as$ the$ positive$ and$ negative$ externalities$ they$ bring$ forth,$ the$ irrationality$ of$ some$
exchanges,$ or$ the$ potential$ ethical$ issues$ raised$ by$ certain$ species$ or$ conditions$ of$
exchanges,$such$as$asymmetries$in$bargaining$power.$$
But$ historical$ and$ contemporary$ economics$ literature$ rarely$ ever$ addresses$ what$
exchanges$ are.$ The$ main$ exceptions$ are$ the$ early$ Austrian$ marginalists,$ who,$
insightfully$if$rather$briskly,$explicitly$stated$the$account$of$exchanges$that$economists$
appear$to$implicitly$rely$on.$In$most$textbooks,$however,$the$nature$of$exchanges$is$just$
assumed$ to$ be$ intuitively$ clear,$ and$ accounts$ of$ exchangeFvalue,$ prices,$ efficiency,$
partial$ equibrium,$ etc.2$are$ then$ developed$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ a$ preFtheoretical$ grasp$ of$
exchanges.$$
Our$ goal$ in$ this$ paper$ is$ to$ provide$ a$ precise$ answer$ to$ the$ question:$ what$ are$
economic$exchanges?$We$want$to$highlight$that,$although$we$shall$argue$that$one$of$the$
most$basic$concepts$of$economics,$exchange,$has$not$been$properly$defined$so$far,$we$do$
not$ contend$ nor$ think$ that$ this$ has$ undermined$ economic$ theorising.$ The$ preF
theoretical$ and$ tacit$ understanding$ of$ exchanges$ has$ proven$ sufficient$ for$ economic$
purposes.$Why$ then$bother$ about$ the$nature$ of$ exchanges,$ if$ an$ explicit$ and$detailed$
understanding$of$them$is$supererogatory$from$the$economic$standpoint?$Here$are$two$
answers.$$
First,$ we$ take$ this$ question$ to$ be$ of$ intrinsic$ interest,$ irrespective$ of$ the$
consequences$ it$ may$ have$ for$ economic$ theorizing.$ Exchanges$ are$ pervasive$ social$
phenomena,$and$scientists$interested$in$the$social$world$should$be$eager$to$get$a$proper$
understanding$of$them.$In$other$words,$rather$than$using$exchanges$as$explanantia(used$
to$ shed$ light$ on$ other$ phenomena$ (such$ as,$ typically,$ exchange$ value,$ prices),$ taking$
exchanges$as$our$explananda$is,$we$submit,$an$epistemically$valuable$inquiry.$
Second,$ as$ we$ shall$ suggest,$ although$ the$ standard$ conception$ of$ exchanges$may$
have$ been$ good$ enough$ so$ far,$ it$ now$ stands$ in$ tension$ with$ two$ wellFestablished$
directions$ in$ recent$ economic$ research.$ The$ first$ is,$ under$ the$ influence$ of$ rational$
choice$and$game$theory,$the$move$away$from$an$early$focus$on$goods$to$a$new$focus$on$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1$Kirzner$provides$an$illuminating$historical$overview$of$this$proposal$in$Kirzner$1960,$chap.$4.$$
2$It$ could$ be$ objected$ that$ standard$ microeconomics$ in$ fact$ does$ the$ reverse:$ rather$ than$ explaining$
exchangeFvalue$and$prices$ in$ terms$of$exchanges,$ it$ explains$exchanges$ in$ terms$of$exchangeFvalue$and$
prices.$But$this$tension$disappears$as$soon$as$we$distinguish$the$project$of$explaining$what(exchanges(are$
from$the$project$of$explaining(what( causes( exchanges(occur.(One$cannot$explain$what$exchanges$are$by$
appealing$ to$ exchangeFvalue,$ on$ pain$ of$ vicious$ circularity$ (we$ need$ to$ grasp$ what$ exchanges$ are$ to$
understand$ the$ concept$ of$ exchangeFvalue).$ But$ one$ surely$ can$ explain$ why$ such$ and$ such$ exchanges$
occur$by$appealing$to$exchangeFvalues$of$the$exchanged$items$for$the$exchangers.$
! 3!
actions.$ The$ standard$ conception$ of$ exchanges,$modelled$ on$ exchanges$ of$ goods,$ has$
thus$become$at$odds$with$contemporary$gameFtheoretic$approaches$to$microeconomics$
whose$ starting$ points$ are$ preferences$ ranging$ over$ actions$ rather$ than$ commodities.$
Second,$a$growing$amount$of$research$lies$at$the$intersection$of$economics$and$law.$The$
standard$ conception$ of$ exchanges,$ not$ taking$ into$ account$ the$ normative$ aspects$ of$
exchanges,$ fails$ to$ draw$ any$ clear$ link$ between$ exchanges$ and$ law.$ By$ contrast,$ the$
actionFtheory$ of$ exchange$ we$ shall$ advocate$ is$ more$ in$ tune$ with$ such$ recent$
developments$in$economics.$While$still$being$able$to$account$for$exchanges$of$goods,$it$
views$ exchanges$ of$ actions$ as$ the$ most$ basic$ phenomena,$ in$ accordance$ with$ game$
theory.$ Furthermore,$ by$ putting$ emphasis$ on$ offers,$ understood$ as$ conditional$
promises,$ it$ provides$ a$ straightforward$ way$ to$ connect$ exchanges$ with$ contractual$
obligations.$
In$ section$ 1$ we$ introduce$ what$ we$ take$ to$ be$ the$ standard$ theory$ of$ exchanges,$
which$we$ retrieve$ from$various$ tacit$ and$explicit$ assumptions$widely$made$across$ the$




























transfers$ her$ bike$ to$ Paul$ and$ (iv)$ Paul$ voluntarily$ transfers$ his$money$ to$ her.$More$













The$ “because”$ in$ the$ last$ condition$ is$ the$ because$ of$ subjective$ reason:$ each$
exchanger’s$preference$motivates$him$to$transfer$his$good.$Note$that$the$STE$only$spells$
out$ some$necessary$ conditions$ for$ exchanges.$ It$ is$ not$ intended$ to$ give$ the$ complete$
story$about$them.$
The$ STE$ is$ meant$ to$ be$ widely$ encompassing,$ being$ true$ of$ barters$ (“direct$
exchanges”)$ as$ well$ as$ monetary$ exchanges$ (“indirect$ exchanges”).$ Hence$ the$
preferences$ at$ stake$might$ be$ final$ or$ instrumental.$ Presumably,$ Julie’s$ preference$ for$
money$ is$ instrumental,$ that$ is,$ she$ wants$money$ because$ of$ the$ purchasing$ power$ it$
confers;$ Paul’s$ preference$ for$ the$ bike$ is,$ typically,$ not$ instrumental$ in$ this$way:$ Paul$
does$not$value$the$bike$as$a$means$of$exchange.$$









That$exchangeables$are$material$or$ immaterial$goods$ (the$ latter$of$which$ includes$
services)$ is$ arguably$ the$ overarching$ feature$ of$ the$ STE.$ For$ once$ it$ is$ admitted$ that$
what$is$exchanged$are$the$goods$of$the$exchangers,$the$idea$that$exchanges$essentially$
involve$transfers$of$good$becomes$almost$irresistible:$how$could$an$exchange$take$place$
without$ goods$ changing$ hands?$ And$why$would$ such$ a$ swapping$ of$ goods$ ever$ take$
place$if$the$exchangers$were$not$to$value$the$exchanged$goods$in$inverse$fashion?$How$
else$ are$ we$ to$ account$ for$ the$motivation$ to$ exchange$ goods$ if$ not$ by$ these$ inverse$
valuations?$$
This$is$precisely$how$the$appeal$to$inverse$preferences$is$justified.$The$idea$is$simply$
that$ exchanges$ would$ not$ take$ place$ in$ their$ absence.$ If$ potential$ exchangers$ were$ to$
value$goods$ in$exactly$ the$same$way,$ they$would$never$bother$exchanging.$What$ is$ the$
point$ of$ exchanging$ a$ oneFdollar$ coin$ against$ another,$ or$ a$ bottle$ of$Château$Margaux$
1982$ against$ an$ exactly$ similar$ one?$ Exchangers$ are$ willing$ to$ exchange$ because$ each$
exchanger$values,$ex( ante,$ the$other’s$good(s)$more$ than$his$own.$Each$exchanger$ thus$
expects$to$be$better$off$after$the$exchange.$Such$ex(ante$valuations$might$prove$wrong.$
Exchangers$ might$ regret$ the$ exchange:$ they$ can$ be$ disappointed$ by$ the$ good$ they$
received,$or$the$good$they$have$given$up$might$retrospectively$appear$more$valuable$to$
them.$Still,$agents$engage$ in$exchanges$because$they$expect,$correctly$or$not,$ that$ their$
satisfaction$will$increase$as$a$result.$$
Although,$ following$the$standard$contemporary$microeconomics,$we$have$equated$
the$ states$ motivating$ mutual$ transfers$ with$ preferences,$ the$ core$ idea$ need$ not$ be$
expressed$ in$ terms$ of$ preferences.$ The$ STE$ might$ be$ spelled$ out$ in$ terms$ of$ “A(
wants/desires/needs/values/likes…$x$more$than$A$wants/desires/needs/values/likes…$y”$
rather$ than$ “A$ prefers$ x$ to$ y”.$ A$ preference$ is$ a$ single$ attitude$ with$ a$ comparative$
content:$ Prefers(x,y).$ On$ the$ other$ hand,$ Liking( more( and$ its$ cognates$ are$ pairs$ of$
attitudes,$ each$with$ a$ typically$ nonFcomparative$ content:$Likes(x)(more( than( Likes(y).$




shall$ henceforth$ ignore$ this$ distinction,$ and$use$ the$ terms$ “preferring”,$ “liking$more”,$











Thanks$ to$ the$ introduction$ of$ inverse$ preferences,$ upholders$ of$ the$ STE$ are$ in$ a$
position$to$reject$two$simplistic$views$of$exchanges,$which$have$been$thought$to$form$a$
dilemma:$$




is$ the$ loss$ of$ the$ other$ (a$ view$ often$ attributed$ to$ Montaigne,$ albeit$
controversially$so3).$$
One$reason$why$both$horns$of$the$dilemma$are$unattractive$is$that,$if$exchanges$are$
necessarily$ either$ pointless$ or$ detrimental$ to$ one$ exchanger,$ it$ becomes$ unclear$ why$
exchanges$ are$ so$ ubiquitous.$ Once$ inverse$ valuations$ are$ taken$ into$ account,$ the$
dilemma$turns$out$ to$be$a$ false$one.$Because$exchangers$value$goods$ in$ reverse$ways,$
both$ gain$ from$ exchanging.$ No$ contradiction$ is$ involved$ since$ the$ values$motivating$
exchanges$are$subjective:$in$Julie’s$eyes,$Paul’s$money$has$more$value$than$her$bike;$in$
Paul’s$eyes,$Julie’s$bike$is$more$valuable$than$his$money.$(To$anticipate:$we$shall$agree$
that$ the$ dilemma$ above$ needs$ to$ be$ escaped,$ and$ we$ shall$ also$ agree$ that$ goods$
exchanges$are$in$the$end$motivated$by$inverse$preferences.$But$we$shall$argue$in$§6$that$
the$ fundamental$ sense$ in$which$all$ exchanges$—of$ goods$ as$well$ as$ of$ services—$ are$
mutually$beneficial$is$that$they$satisfy$convergent$rather$than$inverse$preferences$of$the$
exchangers.)$
The$ STE$ is$ therefore$ committed$ to$ a$ subjectivist( understanding( of( the( values(
motivating( exchanges( (which$ is$not$ to$ exclude$objective$ values,$ but$ just$ to$ claim$ that$
these$ are$ not$ the$ ones$ motivating$ exchanges).$What$ prompts$ exchanges$ are$ not$ the$
objective$ values$ of$ the$ goods$ that$ are$ exchanged$ (for$ instance,$ the$ quantity$ of$ labour$
they$ incorporate,$ or$ their$ objective$ aesthetic$ worth)$ but$ rather$ the$ exchanger’s$
subjective$valuations$of$the$goods$at$stake.$More$precisely,$it$is$the$subjective$value$of$an(
additional( unit$ of$ that$ good$ to$ the$ subject,$ given$ what$ he$ already$ possesses$ —the$
marginal$utility$of$that$good—$that$lies$behind$the$subject’s$preferences.$Thus$the$STE$is$
naturally$combined$with$a$marginalist$approach$to$economic$value.$$
Additionally,$ the$ STE$ as$ it$ stands$ is$ compatible$ with$ (but$ does$ not$ entail)$
methodological( individualism,$ the$ view$ that$ only$ individuals$ think$ and$ act.$ The$
valuations$at$ stake$ in$an$exchange$are$ the$ individual$mental$ states$of$each$exchanger.$






Few$ economists,$ we$ take$ it,$ would$ readily$ recognize$ in$ the$ STE$ the$ standard$






But$ the$main$reason$why$the$STE$may$not$ look$ like$a$standard$piece$of$economic$
theorizing$ is$ that$ it$ is$ in$ fact$ virtually$ never$ explicitly$ spelled$ out$ in$ the$ economics$
literature.$ The$main$ exceptions$ are$ Austrian$ economists,$ who,$ certainly$ because$ they$





The$ most$ general$ form$ of$ the$ relationship$ responsible$ for$ human$ trade$ is$
therefore$as$follows;$an$economizing$individual$A,$has$a$certain$quantity$of$a$
good$at$his$disposal$which$has$a$smaller$value$to$him$than$a$given$quantity$of$
another$ good$ in$ the$ possession$ of$ another$ economizing$ individual,$ B,$ who$
estimate$ the$ values$ of$ the$ same$ quantities$ of$ goods$ in$ reverse$ fashion,$ the$
given$quantity$of$the$second$good$having$a$smaller$value$to$him$than$the$given$
quantity$of$the$first$good$which$is$at$the$disposal$of$A.$[…]$If,$in$addition,$the$
two$ economizing$ individuals$ (a)$ recognize$ the$ situation$ and$ (b)$ have$ the$
power$actually$to$perform$the$transfer$of$the$goods,$a$relationship$exists$that$
makes$ it$ possible$ for$ them,$by$ a$mere$ agreement,$ to$provide$better$ or$more$
completely,$ for$ the$ satisfaction$ of$ their$ needs$ than$would$ be$ the$ case$ if$ the$
relashionship$were$not$exploited.$(Menger$1976,(p.(179F180).$
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As$we$ saw,$ the$ three$ core$ assumptions$ of$ the$ STE$ are$ (i)$ that$ exchangeables$ are$
goods$ (material$ or$ immaterial);$ (ii)$ that$ exchanges$ involve$ mutual$ transfers$ of$ these$
goods;$and$(iii)$that$exchanges$are$motivated$by$inverse$valuations$of$these$goods.$We$
shall$ now$ argue$ that,$ terminological$ variations$ aside,$ these$ three$ assumptions$ are$
standardly$admitted$across$economic$textbooks.$
(i)$ Consider$ first$ the$ view$ that$ exchangeables$ are$ goods( (or$ bundles,$ baskets$
thereof).$ This$ assumption$ is$ shared$ not$ only$ by$ Austrians,$ but$ by$ nearly$ all$ early$
neoclassical$economists.$Walras$(1874,$p.$70)$refers$to$“commodities”$(“marchandises”).$
He$insists$that$exchangeables$are$commodities,(and$that$these$belong$to$the$category$of$
things.( Following$ him,$ microeconomics$ assumes$ that$ trade$ bears$ on$ goods,$
commodities,$ or$ bundles$ thereof.$ One$ clear$ symptom$ of$ this$ is$ that$ the$ variables$ of$
economic$formalizations$are$individual$variables$(x,(y,(z…),$not$propositional$ones$(p,(q,(
r…).$ The$ preferences$ appealed$ to$ in$ economic$ theorizing$ are$ objectual$ preferences$
(preferring$ x$ to$ y)$ rather$ than$ propositional$ ones$ (x$ prefers$ to$ F$ rather$ than$ to$G;( x$
prefers$that$p$rather$than$that$q).$Indifference$curves,$for$instance,$are$held$to$represent$
the$ possible$ combinations$ of$ two$ (bundles$ of)$ goods$ between$ which$ consumers$ are$
indifferent.$$
Why$ such$ a$ focus$ on$ goods?$Why$ does$ economics$ tend$ to$ give$ priority$ to$ goods$
over$ services$ by$ subsuming$ the$ later$ under$ the$ former?$ One$ chief$ reason$ for$ this,$
advanced$ by$ Hill$ (1976,$ 1999),$ is$ that$ economics$ is$ often$ conceived$ as$ studying$ the$
allocation$of$scarce$resources$and$relatedly,$as$bearing$on$wealth,$usually$conceived$in$
terms$ of$ possession$ of$ goods.$ Under$ this$ conception$ of$ economics,$ the$ only$ way$ for$
services$ to$ be$ included$ in$ its$ field$ of$ inquiry$ is$ for$ them$ to$make$ a$ difference$ in$ the$
wealth$ of$ individuals$ (or$ nations).$ For$ this,$ services$ need$ to$ be$ seen$ as$ allocatable(
resources,$ that$ is,$ as$ goods.$ If,$ on$ the$ other$ hand,$ being$ rendered$ a$ service$ does$ not$





as$ amply$ documented$ by$Hill$ (1999),$ and$ as$ a$ consequence$ exchanges$ of$ services$ are$
seen$as$subFcases$of$exchanges$of$goods.$
Is$ this$ objectual$ approach$ to$ exchanges$ still$ at$ play$ in$ contemporary$









objects$of$ choice$ for$ the$consumer”$ (MasFColell,$Whinston,$Green,$ 1995$p.$ 17;$ see$also$
Kreps,$ 1990,$p.$ 18F19,$Arnold$ 2015,$ p.$ 26).$ In$one$of$ the$ few$works$ explicitly$ aiming$ at$
providing$ a$ gameFtheoretic$ approach$ to$ economic$ exchanges5,$ Hardin$ (1982,$ 251F2)$




moving$ from$ objectFpreferences$ to$ actionsFpreferences,$ microeconomics$ would$ have$
moved$ correspondingly$ from$ the$ view$ that$ services$ are$ intangibles$ goods$ to$ the$ view$
that$services$are$actions.$But$this$did$not$happen:$services$are$still$treated$as$intangible$
commodities$ in$ contemporary$ microeconomic$ textbooks$ (Varian$ 1992,$ p.$ 314;$ MasF
Colell,$Whinston,$Green$ 1995,$p.$ 17).$One$also$continues$ to$apply$ to$ services$ the$ large$
panoply$of$concepts$tailorFmade$for$the$economics$of$goods:$thus$services$are$said$to$be$
such$that$they$can$be$had$ (Johnson,$ 1958),$be$part$of$one’s$endowment,$be$given(up(or(
received( (as$ entailed$ by$ standard$ definitions$ of$ marginal$ rate$ of$ substitution)$ or$ be$
accumulated.$But$how$could$one$have,$be$endowed$with,$give$up,$receive$or$accumulate$
actions?$Thus,$although$the$modern$decisionFtheoretic$approach$to$microeconomics$de$
facto$ entails$ —correctly$ in$ our$ view—$ that$ fundamental$ exchangeables$ are$ actions,$
microeconomics$continues$to$conceive$of$them$as$goods.$




shall$ advance$one$ in$§5).$ In$ lack$of$ such$a$proposal,$ the$only$available$way$ to$explain$
goods$exchanges$is$to$revert$back$to$the$standard$objectual$conception$of$exchanges.$As$
a$result,$the$paradigm$shift$from$goodFdriven$to$actionFdriven$microeconomics$remains$
incomplete.$ On$ exchangeables,$ to$ paraphrase$ Quine,$ economists$ tend$ to$ remain$
instinctively$“goodsFminded”.$
(ii)$ Second,$ is$ the$ assumption$ that$ exchanges$ involve$ transfers$ of$ goods$ also$
standard?$We$noted$ that$ this$ is$ a$ very$natural$ view$ to$hold$ once$ exchangeables$ have$
been$ equated$with$ goods,$ and$ it$ is$ unsurprisingly$widely$ accepted.$Menger$ speaks$ of$
“mutual$transfers”$(Menger$1976,$p.$177F178);$Fischer$writes$that$“An$exchange$consists$of$
two$mutual$ and$ voluntary$ transfers,$ each$ in$ consideration$ of$ the$ other”$ (Fisher$ 1912,$
chap$ 1,$ §1:$ 3);$more$ recently,$Arnold$writes$ that$ “Exchange,$ or$ trade,$ is$ the$process$of$










to$ secure$ for$ himself$ superior$ value.$ Each$ surrenders$ something$ to$which$he$ attaches$
less$utilityFvalue$than$he$does$to$the$good$or$service$which$he$obtains$in$exchange.$[…]$it$
must$ happen$ that$ the$ two$ parties$ estimate$ the$ two$ objects$ of$ exchange$ in$ a$ directly$
opposite$manner$so$that$both$may$be$able$simultaneously$to$receive$better$value$by$the$
same$transaction.”$(Wieser,$1927,$p.$167$—similar$Austrian$descriptions$are$to$be$found$
in$Menger$ 1976,$p.$ 179F180,$BohmFBawerk$ 1881,$p.$ 179F180;$ von$Mises$ 1949,$p.$ 204F205;$
Rothbard$2009,$p.$880F881;$Kirzner$1960,$p.$76;$to$which$Wicksteed$1910,$p.$126F157,$may$
be$added).$$
But$ even$ though$ the$ phraseology$ of$ “inverse$ valuation”,$ “reverse$ preference”,$ or$
“valuing$goods$in$reverse$fashion”$is$typically$Austrian,$the$idea$behind$it$—that,$in$any$
exchange,$ one$ prefers$ what$ one$ gets$ to$ what$ one$ cedes—$ is$ shared$ far$ beyond$ the$
Austrian$heterodoxy.$The$ idea$ is$usually$expressed$ in$terms$of$mutual$advantages:$ the$
reason$why$exchanges$are$mutually$beneficial$(ex(ante,$but$no$necessarily$ex(post6),$it$is$
claimed,$ is$ precisely$ that$ each$ exchanger$ values$ the$ good$ of$ the$ other$more$ than$ his$
own.$Hence$the$exchangers$expect$to$be$better$off$by$swapping$goods.$
The$ idea$ is$ already$ to$ be$ found$ in$ Aquinas:$ “buying$ and$ selling$ seem$ to$ be$
established$for$the$common$advantage$of$both$parties,$one$of$whom$requires$that$which$
belongs$ to$ the$other,$and$vice$versa.”$ (Aquinas$ 1920,$question$77,$chap.1).$But$ the$ first$






in$ 1823:$ “Whenever$ I$make$ an$ exchange$ freely,$ and$without$ constraint,$ it$ is$ because$ I$
desire$the$thing$I$receive$more$than$that$I$give;$and,$on$the$contrary,$he$with$whom$I$






Imagine$ that$ there$ is$ one$ trading$ body$ possessing$ only$ corn,$ and$ another$





to$be$beneficial?$ […]$ if,( to( the( trading( body(which( possesses( corn,( ten( pounds( of(












the$ last$ unit$ of$ his$ own$ goods.$ Jevons’$ proposal$ was$ reformulated$ ten$ years$ later$ by$
Edgeworth$ through$ the$ introduction$ of$ indifference$ curves.$ His$ famous$ “box”,$ which$
vividly$ illustrates$ Jevon’s$ marginalist$ story$ above,$ is$ one$ place$ where$ the$ inverse$
preference$ story$ surfaces$ in$ textbooks$of$microeconomics.$Although$ the$ idea$ that$ two$
individuals$will$gain$ from$exchange$as$ long$as$each$continues$to$prefer$something$the$
other$has$ to$ something$he$himself$ has$ is$ now$ typically$ couched$ in$mathematical$ and$
technical$ terms$ —Edgeworth$ box,$ marginal$ rate$ of$ substitution—$ colloquial$
formulations$ of$ the$ idea$have$not$ disappeared.$ For$ instance,$Marshall$writes:$ “If$ each$
gives$up$that$which$has$for$him$the$lower$utility$and$receives$that$which$has$the$higher,$
each$will$gain$by$the$exchange.”$(Marshall$ 1920,$chap.$5,$§1).$ In$their$recent$textbooks,$
Pindyck$ and$ Rubinfeld$ explain$ that$ “There$ is$ thus$ room$ for$ mutually$ advantageous$
trade$because$James$values$clothing$more$highly$than$Karen$does,$whereas$Karen$values$
food$more$highly$than$James$does.”$(Pindyck,$Rubinfeld$2005,$p.$603).$$
Finally,$ note$ that$ outside$ economics$ the$ same$ basic$ idea$ surfaces$ in$ philosophical$
writings.$ For$ instance,$ Reinach$ (1983,$ p.$ 3)$ writes:$ “Where$ two$ persons$ each$ have$ an$
object$ in$ their$ possession$ and$ each$ of$ the$ persons$ wants$ what$ the$ other$ has$ and$ is$
willing$to$give$up$his$own$thing$for$the$sake$of$getting$it,$the$immediate$exchange$of$the$
things$is$the$indicated$way$of$satisfying$the$desire$of$both.”$More$recently$Hardin$(1982)$
characterizes$economics$exchanges$ in$ terms$of$ “reverse$valuation”$and$Brennan$(2016)$
writes$ that$"exchange$ is$made$possible$by$the$ fact$ that$ I$have$a$greater$desire$ for$ that$
which$the$other$has$(and$I$want)$than$for$that$which$I$have".$$
The$ three$ central$ features$ of$ the$ STE$—exchangeables$ as$ (i)$ goods$which$ are$ (ii)$
mutual$ transferred$ and$ (iii)$ valuated$ in$ reverse$ fashion—$ are$ therefore$ assumptions$
widely$ shared,$ not$ only$ by$ Austrian$ economists,$ but$ in$ most$ of$ the$ historical$ and$
contemporary$ economics$ literature.$ We$ conclude$ that$ the$ view$ that$ exchanges$ are$
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mutual$transfers$of$goods$motivated$by$inverse$valuations$thereof$correctly$captures$the$






exchange$unaccounted$ for.$We$only$get$a$partial$ insight$ into$the$nature$of$exchanges.$
To$ reach$a$more$ complete$ account$of$ exchanges,$ at$ least$ three$points$will$need$ to$be$
explained:$
1.$ Bridging( the( gap.$ The$ explanatory$ step$ from$ inverse$ preferences$ (1)$ to$ mutual$
transfers$ (2)$ is$ incomplete$ as$ it$ stands.$ The$ preferences$ are$ held$ to$ motivate$ the$
transfers,$ but$ are$ clearly$ not$ sufficient$ to$ do$ so.$Why$ should$ Julie’s$ preferring$ Paul’s$
money$ to$ her$ bike$ lead$ her$ to$ transfer$ her$ bike$ to$ Paul?$ Absent$ further$ explanation,$








is$missing$ in$ the$ STE$ is$ an$understanding$of$ the$ explanatory$ connection$between$ the$
two$transfers:$ Julie$ transfers$her$bike$to$Paul$against$Paul’s$money.$And$ likewise,$Paul$
gives$his$money$for$Julie’s$bike.$$
3.$Claims( and( obligations.$Another$connected$worry$ is$ that$ claims$and$obligations$
arise$ at$ some$ point$ in$ any$ exchange,$ and$ the$ STE$ leaves$ them$ unexplained.$ Suppose$



















occur$ “by$ mere$ agreement”$ of$ the$ parties$ (1976,$ p.$ 179).$ Shared$ knowledge$ and$
agreement$ may$ be$ thought$ to$ readily$ account$ for$ our$ three$ missing$ points.$ (1)$ The$
reason$ why$ Julie$ transfers$ her$ bike$ to$ Paul$ is$ that$ Paul$ has$ agreed$ to$ reciprocate$ by$
transferring$his$money$to$Julie.$And$both$reach$these$agreements$in$virtue$of$knowing$
the$preferences$of$each$other.$(2)$The$quid(pro(quo$of$exchange$is$also$explained.$Julie$
transfers$ her$ bike$ against$ Paul’s$ money$ because$ this$ is$ what$ she$ and$ Paul$ mutually$





First,$ shared$ knowledge$ of$ each$ other’s$ valuations$ of$ the$ goods$ at$ stake$ is$ quite$
demanding:$ for$ exchanges$ to$ take$place,$ each$party$would$have$ to$have$knowledge$of$
the$private,$ subjective$preferences$of$ the$other.$But,$as$Anderson$ (1993,$p.$ 146)$ rightly$




Second,$ as$ we$ stressed$ above,$ and$ as$ agreed$ by$Menger,$ the$ STE$ is$meant$ to$ be$
compatible$ with$ methodological$ individualism.$ But$ it$ is$ controversial$ whether$
agreements$ are$ compatible.$ While$ agreements$ are$ often$ construed$ as$ exchanges$ of$
promises$ —which$ are$ individual$ acts—,$ Margaret$ Gilbert$ (1993)$ has$ argued$ that$ no$
exchange$ of$ promises$ can$ give$ rise$ to$ the$ sort$ of$ simultaneous$ and$ interdependent$
obligations$that$characterize$agreements.$Joint$commitments$lie$according$to$her$at$the$
heart$ of$ agreements.$ If$ she$ is$ right,$ then$ plugging$ in$ agreement$ in$ the$ analysis$ of$
exchanges$ is$ incompatible$ with$ methodological$ individualism.$ The$ action$ theory$ of$














Our$ second$objection$ against$ the$ STE$ is$more$damaging:$ the$ STE$ fails$ to$ provide$





its$ upholders$ stress$ that$ “goods”,$ or$ “commodities”,$ encompasses$more$ than$material$
goods:$“goods”$also$encompasses$intangible(goods,$of$which(services$are$allegedly$a$subF
species.$
We$ agree$ that$ there$ are$ intangible$ goods$ and$ that$ intangible$ goods$ can$ be$
exchanged:$pieces$of$music,$ theories,$ the$blueprint$ for$a$new$car,$computer$programs,$
etc.$are$instances$thereof.7$We$submit$that$rights$(rights$to$use$a$good,$financial$claims$
ensuing$ from$ debts…)$ are$ another$ central$ case$ of$ nonFtangible$ goods$ which$ can$ be$
exchanged.$Julie$can$rent$her$bike$to$Paul$for$an$hour,$that$is,$exchange$her$right$to$use$
her$ bike$ during$ that$ hour$ against$ some$money.$Money$ is$ perhaps$ itself$ an$ intangible$
good$ (Smith$ 2003,$ p.$ 285F309).$We$ disagree,$ however,$with$ the$ idea$ that$ services$ are$
intangible$goods.$That$“services$are$not$ intangibles”$has$been$forcefully$argued$by$Hill$
(1976,$ 1999).$ In$what$ follows$we$ shall$ argue$ that$ this$ is$ especially$ true$ in$ the$ case$ of$
exchanges$ of$ services:$ services( cannot( be( transferred,( and( their( exchanges( cannot( be(
motivated(by(inverse(objectEpreferences.$
3.1.!Exchanges!without!transfers!
Consider$ first$ transfers.$ The$ act$ of$ transferring$ something$ is$ an$ episode$ involving$
three$ participants:$ the$ transferer,$ the$ transferee,$ and$ the$ thing$ transferred.$A$ transfer$
unfolds$ in$ such$ a$ way$ that$ at$ the$ beginning$ the$ transferer$ has$ the$ thing$ and$ the$







An$ electron$ can$ thus$ be$ transferred$ from$ one$ atom$ to$ another.$ In$ the$ case$ of$
economic$exchanges,$the$transfers$at$stake$must$be$voluntary,$and$the$“belonging”$must$
be$ of$ the$ economically$ relevant$ kind,$ which$ we$ will$ assume$ here$ is$ ownership8.$ This$
definition$ of$ transfers$ puts$ two$ constraints$ on$ the$ kinds$ of$ entities$ that$ can$ be$
transferred:$
(i)$ transferable$ entities$must$ be$ liable$ to$ enter$ into$ exclusive$ belonging$ relations$
with$some$other$entities$(the$exchangers);$$












bank$ account$ are$ instantaneous—which$ is$ not$ to$ say$ that$ it$ does$ not$ take$ time$ to$
achieve$ them,$ or$ that$ they$ lack$ longFstanding$ effects)$ or$ persist$ by$ having$ temporal$
parts$ (a$ violin$ lesson,$ a$massage,$ a$ lawyer’s$ plea,$ visiting$ a$ cathedral).$ In$ both$ cases,$
services$ cannot$be$ transferred$because$ they$do$not$keep$ their$numerical$ identity$over$
time,$they$do$not$endure10.$$







robber$ of$ Julie’s$ bike$ possesses$ it,$ but$ does$ not$ own$ it).$ What$ follows$ is$ fully$ compatible$ with$ the$
distinction,$ and$ could$ in$ fact$ be$ refined$ thanks$ to$ it,$ distinguishing$ between$ transferring$ the$ mere$
possession$of$a$good$(which$happens$for$instance$on$the$black$market),$the$mere$ownership$of$a$good,$or$
both.$The$possession/ownership$distinction$ is$ sharply$drawn$by$Reinach$ (1983).$See$Massin$ (2015)$ for$a$
presentation$and$defence$of$Reinach’s$account.$






available$ to$ other$ agents.$ Consequently,$ such$ goods$ might$ be$ transmitted$ to$ others$
without$losing$them.$If$Julie$shares$some$of$her$knowledge$to$Paul$in$exchange$for$some$




can$be$ transmitted$without$being$ lost.$But$ since$ transfers$ require$exclusive$belonging,$
the$STE$cannot$account$for$such$exchanges.$If$we$want$to$account$for$the$exchange$of$






STE$ cannot$ accommodate$ cases$ of$ exchanges$ of$ unEowned( goods.$ To$ the$ extent$ that$
rights$are$owned$and$endure$over$time,$rights$can$be$transferred.$For$instance,$Julie$can$
transfer$ to$Paul$—either$ forever$or$ for$ some$ limited$ time—$the$ right$ to$use$her$bike.$
But,$as$urged$by$Reinach,$ transferring$a$ right$ is$not$ the$only$way$ to$confer$a$ right$on$
another$person:$one$might$also$grant$ that$ right$ to$a$person$ (Reinach$ 1983,$§6,$p.$68).$
Suppose$Julie$made$a$promise$to$Paul,$and$that,$for$whatever$reason,$she$asks$Paul$for$
the$right( to( revoke(her(promise.$Paul$might$grant$that$right$to$Julie.$But$that$granting,$
Reinach$urges$correctly,$ is$not$a$transfer,$ for$Paul$never$had$ the$right$to$revoke$Julie’s$
promise$in$the$first$place$(only$the$promisor$might$have$such$a$right).$Thus,$the$right$to$
revoke$a$promise$ is$a$ right$ the$promisee$can$grant,$although$he$never$had$ it.$Besides,$
such$unFowned$ rights$clearly$can$be$exchanged.$Paul$might$grant$ to$ Julie$ the$ right$ to$






the$ piano12),$ transmissions$ (for$ nonFdepletable$ goods,$ e.g.$ knowledge),$ and$ grantings$
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 $What$ economists$ call$ nonFdepletable$ goods$display$ some$ analogies$ with$ universals,$ i.e.$ repeatable$
entities:$nonFdepletable$goods$(e.g.$a$piece$of$knowledge,$a$broadcast,$a$software)$can$be$wholly( had$by$
several$ individuals$ all$ at$ once.$NonFdepletable$ goods$ are$ also$ nonFrival$ goods,$ i.e.$ they$ can$ be$used$ by$
more$than$one$person$at$a$time.$However,$they$are$not$equivalent$to$nonFexcludable$goods$(goods$that$it$






obvious$ that$ there$ exists$ a$natural,$nonFdisjunctive$kind,$which$ subsumes$ transfers$ in$
the$strict$ sense,$ transmissions,$provisions,$grantings,$and$plausibly$other$cases.$At$any$
rate,$it$seems$fair$to$say$that$at$this$point$it$is$up$to$the$STE’s$upholder$to$tell$us$more$
about$ this$ broad$ kind.$ And,$ second,$ even$ if$ such$ a$ kind$ could$ be$ characterised,$ one$
would$ still$ need$ to$ show$ that$ it$ fits$ the$ other$ features$ of$ the$ STE.$ For$ suppose$ that$
transmitting$knowledge$is$now$considered$as$a$kind$of$transfer.$Is$ it$at$all$plausible$to$
say$ that,$ when$ Julie$ shares$ her$ knowledge$ of$ deontic$ logic$ with$ Paul$ against$ some$
money,$ she$values$her$knowledge$ less$ than$ she$values$Paul’s$money?$Or$ suppose$ that$
rendering$a$ service$ is$ considered$as$a$kind$of$ transfer.$ Is$ it$ at$ all$plausible$ to$ say$ that$
when$ Julie$sells$a$biking$ lesson$to$Paul$she$prefers$Paul’s$money$to$her$biking$ lesson?$
Widening$ the$ concept$ of$ transfer$ beyond$ the$ clear$ cases$ of$ material$ and$ immaterial$
goods$ changing$hands$not$ only$ leads$ to$ a$ gerrymandered$ concept$ of$ transfers;$ it$ also$
violates$ the$ letter$ of$ the$ STE,$which$ appeals$ to$ inverse$ valuations,$ as$well$ as$ its$ spirit$








Bawerk$ 1891,(p.$ 190F194).$Upholders$of$ the$STE$are$ right$ that$most$ exchanges$are$ “not$
made$ simply$ for$ amusement”,$ in$ BöhmFBawerk’s$ terms$ (1891,$ book$ 4,$ chap.$ 1).$ But$ as$
long$ as$ some$ exchanges$ are$ pleasurable,$ however$ rare$ they$may$ be,$ a$ good$ theory$ of$
exchange$ should$ accommodate$ them.$ The$ STE$ fails$ to$ account$ for$ such$ exchange$ for$
two$reasons.$First,$the$preferences$involved$in$exchanges$made$for$amusement$are$not$
directed$ at$ goods,$ but$ at$ the$ action$of$ transferring$goods.$ Second,$when$ two$ children$
exchange$ two$ toys$ back$ and$ forth,$ their$ preferences$ are$ not$ opposite$ but$ convergent:$
both$prefer$transferring$toys$mutually$over$not$transferring$toys$mutually.$
But$ the$most$ important$ class$ of$ counterexamples$ to$ the$ claim$ that$ exchanges$ are$
motivated$ by$ inverse$ preferences$ about$ the$ exchangeables$ are,$ again,$ exchanges$ of$
services.$Suppose$ Julie$explains$modal$ logic$ to$Paul$ in$exchange$ for$Paul’s$playing$ the$
violin$to$her.$Should$we$say,$as$entailed$by$the$STE,$that$Julie$values$Paul’s$playing$the$
violin$to$her$more$than$she$values$explaining$modal$logic$to$him?$And$that,$on$the$other$
hand,$Paul$ prefers$ Julie’s$ explaining$modal$ logic$ to$him$ to$playing$ the$ violin$ to$ Julie?$
That$sounds$very$weird.$If$anything,$Paul$and$Julie$have$converging$preferences:$both$of$!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




to$ Julie$ to$ a$ situation$ where$ none$ of$ these$ two$ events$ happens.$ Such$ preferences$ or$
valuations$are$clearly$not$opposite$but$convergent$(more$on$this$below).$






are$ taken$ into$ consideration.$This$ is$not$ to$ say,$nor$ to$ imply,$ that$no$preference$ is$ at$
stake$here,$nor$ that$ the$ idea$of$ exchanges$being$mutually$beneficial$ is$misguided.$On$
the$contrary,$we$shall$argue$that$all$exchanges$ involve$valuations,$preferences$—albeit$
convergent$ones—$in$virtue$of$which$they$are$mutually$beneficial$(not$only$ex(ante,$but$
also$ ex( post).$ Our$ point$ has$ only$ been$ that$ neither$ mutual$ transfers$ nor$ inverse$
preferences$hold$true$in$the$case$of$exchanges$of$services13.$$
This$ confirms$ that,$ as$ argued$ by$Hill,$ it$ is$ a$ bad$mistake$ to$ equate$ services$ with$






above$kind.$While$there$are$clearly$ intangible$goods$(transferable$rights,$ for$ instance),$
the$ distinction$ between$ tangible$ and$ intangible$ goods$ does$ not$ dichotomize$
exchangeables.$ This$ is$ the$ reason$why,$ in$ order$ to$ capture$ exchanges$ of$ services,$ the$
theory$of$exchange$needs$to$accept$exchangeables$which$are$not$goods.$
Services,$we$submit,$do$not$belong$to$the$category$of$objects,$but$to$the$category$of$
actions.$A( service( is( something( one( does( for( somebody,( not( something( one( transfers( to(
somebody.$ Bracketing$ vexing$ issues,$ actions$ are$ not$ primarily$ referred$ to:$ they$ are$
basically$ expressed$ through$ verbs$ and$ propositions,$ not$ names.$ Correspondingly,$ our$
attitudes$towards$actions$are$typically$propositional,$not$objectual.$Not:$preferring$x$to$
y;$but:$preferring$to$φ$rather$than$to$ψ.$Not:$liking$x$more$than$one$likes$y;$but:$liking$to$
φ$ better$ than$ liking$ to$ ψ.$ Actions$ cannot$ be$ owned$ in$ the$ strict$ sense,$ they$ do$ not$
endure$over$time,$and$therefore$cannot$be$transferred.$Yet$they$can$be$exchanged.$They$
are$even,$as$we$shall$now$argue,$the$most$fundamental$exchangeables.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13$Note$ that$ although$ we$ have$ been$ relying$ on$ very$ simple$ examples,$ the$ problems$ we$ raised$
generalize$ to$ more$ complex$ cases$ of$ services,$ such$ as$ financial$ services$ (investment$ management,$
processing$of$credit$cards$transactions,$reinsurance,$etc.)$or$ legal$services.$In$all$cases$where$a$service$is$




In$order$ to$ avoid$ the$problems$ faced$by$ the$STE,$we$proceed$as$ follows.$To$get$ a$
complete$theory$of$exchange,$we$introduce$offer(and$acceptance.$To$get$an$unrestricted$
theory$of$exchange,$able$to$account$for$exchanges$of$services,$we$argue$that$even$in$the$
case$ where$ goods$ are$ exchanged,$ what( is( immediately( exchanged( are( actions.$ One$
consequence$ of$ focussing$ on$ actions$ rather$ than$ goods$ is$ that$ the$ motivating$
preferences$are$convergent$rather$than$inverse.$
The$ view$ that$ actions$ are$ the$ target$ of$ exchanges$ is$ not$ unprecedented.$ It$ was$
endorsed$ by$ Frederic$ Bastiat,$ who$ insisted$ that$ all$ exchanges$ (which$ are$ for$ him$ the$
fundamental$ social$ phenomena)$ are$ fundamentally$ exchanges$ of$ services:$ “every$
transaction$can$be$reduced$to$a$bartering$of$services”$(1851,$p.$106,$see$also,$p.$31F33,$63,$
74F75,$115).$Unfortunately,$perhaps$because$Bastiat$combined$his$approach$to$exchanges$
with$ a$ disputable$ theory$ of$ economic$ value 14 ,$ his$ proposal$ has$ remained$ widely$
neglected.$ One$ exception$ is$ his$ American$ disciple$ Arthur$ Latham$ Perry,$ who$ builds$
upon$Bastiat’s$ proposal$ to$ develop$ a$ plausible$ threefold$ classification$ of$ exchangeable$
entities$ (commodities,$ claims$ and$ services),$ arguing$ that$ the$ latter$ are$ the$most$basic$
(Perry,$1978,$p.$84F87).$$
The$ action$ theory$ of$ exchange$ we$ shall$ now$ propose$ takes$ up$ Bastiat’s$ central$
proposal:$what$we$basically$ exchange$ are$not$ goods$ (which$ fall$ under$ the$ category$of$
objects)$but$services$(which,$as$ just$argued,$ fall$under$the$category$of$actions).$This$ is$
the$ first$ respect$ in$which$our$theory$departs$ from$the$STE.$The$second$respect$ is$ that$
the$action$theory$introduces$social(acts,$namely$offers$and$acceptances,$at$the$heart$of$
exchanges.$




rather$ than$ that$none$of$ these$actions$ take$place.$Paul$has$a$preference$with$basically$
the$ same$ content:$ he$prefers$ [to$ play$ the$ violin$ to$ Julie$ and$ that$ Julie$ explains$modal$
logic$to$him]$rather$than$none$these$actions$take$place.$



















































Second,$ it$ should$ be$ noted$ that$ the$ preferences$ appealed$ to$ in$ the$ ATE$ do$ not$
represent$ the$ whole$ of$ A$ and$ B’s$ preferences$ with$ respect$ to$ the$ actions$ at$ stake.$
Typically,$ each$ exchanger$ prefers$ most$ to$ get$ what$ he$ wants$ without$ having$ to$ give$







that$ are$ here$ in$ bold.$ It$ is$ not$ the$whole$ sets$ of$ the$ exchangers’$ preferences$ that$ are$
convergent,$but$only$the$subFsets$of$those$that$motivate$the$exchange.$






Our$main$reason$ for$not$ retaining$ this$ simpler$phrasing$ is$ that$one$of$ the$actions$
that$each$party$prefers$is$an$action$that$he$identifies$as$an$action$of(himself,$which$the$
thatFformulation$above$ fails$ to$capture.$Applying$ J.$Perry$ (1979)’s$problem$of$essential$
indexicals$to$preferences,$A$might$prefer$that$A$φFs,$without$realising$that$he$is$A.$The$
problem$does$not$arise$with$“A$prefers$to$φ”.$This$issue$will$presumably$often$be$ignored$












Finally,$ one$ chief$ point$ with$ respect$ to$ preferences$ motivating$ exchanges$ is$ that$




is$ a$ course$of$ action$which$both$prefer$ to$alternative$ones.$ In$our$example,$both$ Julie$
and$Paul$prefer$the$course$of$action$in$which$Julie$explains$modal$logic$to$Paul$and$Paul$
plays$ the$violin$ to$ Julie.$How$do$we$move$ from$ these$ converging$preferences$ towards$
the$ exchange?$Although$ the$preferences$of$ the$parties$ are$private,$ their$ expression$or$
disclosure$ is$not$required$ in$order$ for$ Julie$and$Paul$to$move$on$to$the$next$stage.$All$







Although$ Julie’s$ instrumental$ belief$ might$ stem$ from$ some$ beliefs$ or$ guesses$
regarding$the$other$party’s$own$preferences,$they$do$not$have$to.$Julie’s$belief$that$Paul$
might$accept$her$offer$ is$often$ justified$by$her$attributing$to$Paul$some$preference$ for$
her$explaining$modal$logic$to$him.$But$there$is$no$necessity$to$speculate$about$the$other$
agent’s$ preferences$ in$ order$ to$ rationally$make$ an$ offer$ to$ him.$ Surely,$ Julie$ needs$ to$
believe$that$her$offer$has$a$chance$of$being$accepted$by$Paul$in$order$to$make$it$to$him.$
But$ she$does$not$need$ to$believe$ that$he$prefers$her$explaining$modal$ logic$ to$him$ in$
order$ to$offer$ to$explain$modal$ logic$ to$him$ in$exchange$ for$him$playing$ the$violin$ to$
her.$This$ is$because$she$does$not$need$to$know$what$might$prompt$him$to$accept$her$
offer$ in$ order$ to$ make$ such$ an$ offer.$ An$ economic$ agent$ conditioned$ purely$
behaviourally,$ lacking$ any$ theory$ of$ mind,$ could$ still$ rationally$ proceed$ to$ make$ an$
offer.$“Making$some$kind$of$offers$happens$to$get$me$what$I$want.$I$have$no$clue$about$
why$this$is$so,$but$this$works”.$$
Besides,$ even$when$ Julie’s$offer$ is$motivated$by$her$ ascribing$ some$preferences$ to$
Paul,$Paul’s$acceptance$will$often$remain$blind$to$Julie’s$own$preferences:$typically,$only$
the$ offer$ will$ matter$ to$ him,$ regardless$ of$ its$ underlying$ motivation.$ So$ neither$




(2.1)$ Following$ Kent$ Bach$ (1995) 17 ,$ we$ assume$ that$ offers$ are$ promises$ with$
conditional$ content.$ There$ is$ a$ distinction$ between$ unconditional( promises( with(
conditional( content$ (I$promise$that$ if$p,$ I$φ),$and$conditional( promises$ (If$p,$ I$promise$














That$ is,$necessarily,$ in$ virtue$of$ the$nature$of$promises,$ if$A$ promises$ to$φ$ to$B,$
then$ (1)$ B$ heard$ and$ understood$ A’s$ utterance$ (ii)$ as$ an$ immediate$ result$ of$ this$
promise,$A$incurs$the$obligation$to$φ$and$B$incurs$the$correlative$(same$content)$claim$
to$A’s$ φFing.$ In$ the$ case$ of$ promises$ with$ conditional$ content,$ the$ obligation$ of$ the$
offeror$ and$ the$ related$ claim$of$ the$ offeree$ also$ arise$ at$ the$ very$moment$ the$ offer$ is$











closely$ on$ this$ point.$ Conditional$ promises$ (externally$ conditional$ promises$ in$ Gilbert’s$ terms)$ raise$
difficult$ issues$ about$ the$ time$ at$ which$ the$ corresponding$ obligations$ arise.$ Additionally,$ one$ might$
suspect$ that$ conditional$ promises$ are$ either$ not$ promises$ (but$ expressions$ of$ intentions$ to$ promise$ if$
some$conditions$are$met)$or$that$they$are$secondForder$promises$with$conditional$content:$“If$p,$I$promise$
(to$φ)”$would$then$amount$to$“I$promise$that$(If$p,$I$will$promise$to$φ)”.$
19$These$ two$ features$ of$ promises$ are$ widely$ accepted,$ and,$ since$ Hume$ at$ least,$ most$ philosophical$
debates$about$promises$have$focussed$on$how$to$explain$the$second$feature:$how$do$promises$generate$





One$ might$ object$ that$ many$ exchanges$ occur$ without$ any$ offers$ having$ been$
made.$ This$ however$ neglects$ the$ fact$ that$many$ offers$ remain$ implicit$ or$ tacit.$Price(
tags,(for(instance,(constitute(one(ubiquitous(form(of(offer$(no$to$be$conflate$with$prices,$
which,$contrary$to$price$tags,$are$determined$by$the$exchanges$actually$taking$place).$
Another$ possible$ objection$ is$ that$ the$ preference$ of$ the$ offeree$ is$ often$ not$ fixed$
before$ the$ offer.$ Offers$ might$ prompt$ new$ preferences$ or$ change$ the$ preferences$ of$
offerees.$We$entirely$agree:$ it$could$be$ that$Paul$did$not$have$a$preference$ for$buying$













b) To$accept$an$offer$may$be$simply$voluntarily$ fulfilling( the( condition$ specified$ in$
its$ content.$Accepting$ an$offer$ conditional$ on$ a$payment$might$ just$be$ putting$






offers$conditioned$on$promises$of$payment.$These$ two$kinds$of$offers$give$ rise$ to$ two$
very$distinct$sorts$of$exchanges.$Suppose$Julie$promises$Paul$to$explain$modal$ logic$to$






exchange$ is$ a$ financial$ claim$ (i.e.$ the$ right$ to$ receive$money$ latter)$ rather$ than$ some$
money.$ Such$ a$ claim$ does$ not$ need$ to$ be$met$ for$ the$ exchange$ to$ have$ taken$ place.$
Debts$ are$ exchanged$ in$ financial$markets,$ whether$ or$ not$ these$ debts$will$ be$ repaid.$
! 25!
Offers$ conditioned$ on$ transfers$ of$ goods$ are$ distinct$ from$ offers$ conditioned$ on$
promises$of$transfer$of$goods.$$
With$this$distinction$in$hand,$our$proposal$is$that$promises$constitute$acceptances$
only$ in$ the$ latter$ case,$ that$ is,$ the$ case$ of$ offers$ conditioned$ on$ promises.$ Not$ all$
acceptances$are$promises;$only$acceptance$of$offers$conditioned$on$promises$are.$Thus$
in$any$case,$accepting$an$offer$is$just$fulfilling$its$condition.$$





when$ Paul$ replies$ to$ Julie’s$ offer$ by$ saying$ “I$ accept,$ I$ will$ pay$ you$ by$ tomorrow”,$ it$
would$ perfectly$ correct$ for$ Julie$ to$ retort,$ without$ violating$ any$ of$ her$ promissory$
obligations,$ “No( credit( given,$ I$ want$ a$ payment,$ not$ a$ promise$ thereof”.$Were$ Paul’s$
promise$ to$ count$ as$ an$ acceptance,$ Julie$ would$ be$ refusing$ Paul’s$ acceptance$ of$ her$
offer,$which$she$is$not$entitled$to$do$(the$best$she$can$do$is$to$revoke$her$promise$—to$
retract$ her$ offer—$ but$ for$ this,$ as$ we$ saw$ in$ §3.1.$ Paul$ has$ to$ grant$ her$ the$ right$ to$
revoke).$





payment$ is,$ we$ surmise,$ easily$ explained$ through$ conversational$ implicatures.$ For$





does$not$accept$ that$offer,$but$ instead$makes$the$ following$counter$offer:$he$promises$
Julie$ that,$ if$ she$ explains$ modal$ logic$ to$ him,$ he$ will$ pay$ her.$ It$ is$ now$ up$ to$ Julie$
whether$to$accept$that$offer$or$not.$In$such$a$case,$some$other$intermediary$steps$would$
have$taken$place$between$the$first$offer$(2.1)$and$the$acceptance$of$the$final$offer$(2.2),$
namely,$ a$ negotiation.$ Admittedly,$ while$ exchanges$ often$ involve$ such$ turnarounds,$
these$are$not$essential$components$of$them.!
4.3!Provisions!
(3.1)$Before$ the$ condition$ specified$ in$ Julie’s$ offer$has$been$ fulfilled,$Paul’s$ claim$
and$Julie’s$related$obligation$remain$conditional,$unFactivated.$But,$once$Paul$has$played$
! 26!
the$ violin$ to$ Julie,$ his$ claim$ to$ Julie’s$ logic$ lesson,$ together$ with$ Julie’s$ obligation$ to$
provide$such$a$lesson,$become$fully$actual$and$unconditional.$
(3.2)$These$two$correlative$claims$and$obligations$are$met$and$disappear$once$Julie$





We$argued$ that$ the$STE,$because$ it$ is$ tailorFmade$ for$ exchanges$of$goods,$ cannot$





position$ to$ subsume$ exchanges$ of$ services$ and$ exchanges$ of$ goods$ under$ the$ same$
heading.$ Such$ a$ disjunctive$ line$ of$ thought$ naturally$ suggests$ itself$ once$we$ take$ the$
measure$ of$ the$ categorial$ distinction,$ emphasised$ above,$ between$ goods$ and$ services.$
Tempting$as$it,$this$disjunctive$approach$to$the$concept$of$exchange$should$however$be$
resisted$ for$ one$ simple$ reason:$ goods$ can$ be$ exchanged$ against$ services.$ There$must$
therefore$ be$ one$ overarching$ concept$ of$ exchange,$ which$ subsumes$ goodsFforFgoods,$
servicesFforFservices$ and$ servicesFforFgoods$ exchanges.$ This,$ we$ maintain,$ is$ the$











(2)$ Because$ of$ her$ preference$ and$ of$ her$ belief,$ Julie$makes$ the$ following$offer$ to$
Paul:$ “I$ promise$ you$ that,$ if$ you$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$ your$money$ to$me,$ I$ will$
transfer$the$ownership$of$my$bike$to$you.”$$
(3)$Because$of$his$preference,$Paul$accepts$Julie’s$offer$and$transfers$the$ownership$







$ (1.1)$ A$ prefers$ [to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$ x$ to$ B$ and$ that( B$ transfers$ the$
ownership$of$y$to$him]$to$[not$to$transfer$the$ownership$of$x$to$B$and$that(B$does$
not$transfers$the$ownership$of$y$to$him]$
$ (1.2)$ B$ prefers$ [to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$ y$ to$ A$ and$ that( A$ transfers$ the$
ownership$of$x$to$him]$to$[not$to$transfer$the$ownership$of$y$to$A$and$that(A$does$
not$transfers$the$ownership$of$x$to$him]$
$ (1.3)$A$ believes$ that$ promising$ to$B$ to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$x$ to$B$ on$ the$





(2.2)$ The( acceptance:$ Because$ of$ (1.2),$ B$ accepts$ the$ offer.$ Hence,$ B$ incurs$ the$
obligation$to$ fulfil$ the$condition$specified$ in$A’s$promise:$B$ought$to$transfer$the$
ownership$of$y$to$B.$
(3)(Provisions:$





There$ are$ however$ strong$ reasons$ to$ reject$ this$ proposal.$ Exchanging$ transfers$ of$
goods$is$necessary$but$not$sufficient$to$exchange$goods.$To$see$this,$consider$the$case$of$
exchanges$ made$ simply$ for$ amusement.$ Such$ exchanges,$ we$ argued$ (§3.2.),$ are$
motivated$ by$ preferences$ bearing$ on$ the$ actions$ of$ transferring,$ rather$ than$ by$
preferences$bearing$on$the$goods$exchanged.$What$the$exchangers$really$exchange$(and$
enjoy)$are$not$goods,$but$actions$of$transferring$goods.$Our$point$was$that$the$STE,$with$
its$ inverse$ objectFpreferences,$ couldn’t$ accommodate$ such$ exchanges,$ because$ the$
preferences$motivating$them$are$convergent.$
Now$this$objection$to$the$STE$backfires$against$our$ATE$in$the$present$context.$ If$
exchanges$ made$ for$ amusement$ are$ ultimately$ just$ exchanges$ of$ actions$ and$ not$
! 28!









To$ answer$ this$ important$ worry,$ we$ propose$ utilising$ the$ STE’s$ own$ arsenal.$ To$
distinguish$ between$ exchanges$ of$ transfers$ of$ ownership$ of$ goods$ simpliciter$ and$
genuine$ exchanges$ of$ goods$ we$ suggest$ appealing$ to$ the( preferences( that( ground( the(
preferences(for(transfers.$The$idea$is$that$what$distinguishes$mere$exchanges$of$transfers$
of$ goods$ from$ exchanges$ of$ goods$ is$ that,$ in$ the$ latter$ but$ not$ the$ former$ case,$ the$
preferences$ for$ transferring$ the$ ownership$ of$ goods$ are$ grounded$ in$ the$ opposite$
preferences$for$goods.$This$is$the$important$grain$of$truth$in$the$STE.$We$thus$need$to$







$ (1.1)$Because! (0.1),$A$ prefers$ [to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$ x$ to$ B$ and$ that( B$
transfers$the$ownership$of$y$to$him]$to$[not$to$transfer$the$ownership$of$x$to$B$and$
that(B$does$not$transfers$the$ownership$of$y$to$him]$
$ (1.2)$Because! (0.2),$B$ prefers$ [to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$ y$ to$A$ and$ that( A$
transfers$the$ownership$of$x$to$him]$to$[not$to$transfer$the$ownership$of$y$to$A$and$
that(A$does$not$transfers$the$ownership$of$x$to$him]$
$ (1.3)$A$ believes$ that$ promising$ to$B$ to$ transfer$ the$ ownership$ of$x$ to$B$ on$ the$






(2.2)$ The( acceptance:$ Because$ of$ (1.2),$ B$ accepts$ the$ offer.$ Hence,$ B$ incurs$ the$
obligation$to$ fulfil$ the$condition$specified$ in$A’s$promise:$B$ought$to$transfer$the$
ownership$of$y$to$B.$
(3)(Provisions:$






goods$ at$ stake:$ what$ they$ value$ is$ the$ activity$ of$ transferring.$ Their$ preferences$ for$
transfers$ are$not$grounded$ in$ inverse$preferences$ for$ goods,$ conditions$ (0.1)$ and$ (0.2)$
are$ not$ met.$ Accordingly,$ goods$ are$ here$ mere$ decorations,$ and$ all$ we$ have$ is$ an$
exchange$of$services$(namely,$of$transfers).$
If,$on$the$other$hand,$the$exchangers$prefer$to$transfer$the$ownership$of$their$goods$
because$ they$ prefer$ each$ other’s$ goods,$ then$ we$ have$ an$ exchange$ of$ goods.$ When$
exchanges$ of$ transfers$ of$ ownership$ of$ goods$ are$ ultimately$ grounded$ in$ reverse$
preferences$ for$ these$ goods,$ then$ is$ it$ is$ right$ to$ say$ that$ these$ goods$ are$ exchanged.$
Note,$ incidentally,$ that$ this$ story$ typically$ holds$ for$ offers$ conditioned$ on$ promises,$










valuing$ownership( of( goods.$ These$ valuations$ usually$ go$ together:$we$ often$ prefer$ the$
good$that$we$prefer$to$own.$But$this$does$not$need$to$be$so.$Julie$might$prefer$her$castle$
to$ Paul’s$ house,$ but$ nevertheless$ prefer$ owning$ Paul’s$ house$ to$ owning$ her$ castle$
(because,$say,$maintaining$the$castle$it$too$costly).$Paul,$on$the$other$hand,$might$prefer$
his$ house$ to$ Julie’s$ castle,$ but$ nevertheless$ prefer$ owning$ Julie’s$ castle$ to$ his$ house$
(because,$say,$his$house$is$in$a$country$in$which$he$has$fiscal$troubles).$In$such$a$case,$
Paul$ and$ Julie$ might$ end$ up$ exchanging$ the$ ownership$ of$ their$ house$ and$ castle.$
However,$the$targets$of$their$exchange$are$not$the$castle$and$the$house,$but$rather$the$





Second,$whether$ an$ exchange$ is$ ultimately$ an$ exchange$ of$ goods,$ an$ exchange$ of$
ownership,$ or$ just$ an$ exchange$ of$ transfers,$ is$ dependent$ on$ each$ exchanger’s$
motivation.$Since$these$ intrinsic$motivations$need$not$be$the$same,$one$and$the$same$
exchange$ can$ be$ both$ an$ exchange$ of$ goods$ relative$ to$ one$ exchanger$ and$ a$ pure$
exchange$of$action$relative$to$the$other.$Suppose$Julie$transfers$her$bike$to$Paul$against$
some$ money$ because$ she$ values$ Paul’s$ money$ more$ than$ her$ bike,$ and$ that$ Paul$
transfers$her$money$to$Julie$against$her$transferring$her$bike$to$him,$because$he$simply$
loves$ transacting$ with$ Julie.$ This$ single$ exchange$ proceeds$ from$ two$ very$ different$
motivations:$ for$ Julie,$ the$ exchange$ is$ ultimately$ motivated$ by$ intrinsic$ object$




possible$grounds$ for$ the$action$preferences$(on$which$the$ATE$relies),$ the$ATE$ is$ in$a$
position$ to$distinguish$between$ exchanges( of( goods,$ exchanges( of( ownership( of( goods,$








The$ ATE$ avoids$ all$ these$ flaws:$ (i)$ The$ motivational$ gap$ is$ filled$ since$ the$
preferences$motivating$ exchanges$ bear$ on$ the$ very$ actions$ constitutive$ of$ exchanges,$
which$ also$ figure$ in$ the$ content$ of$ the$ offer,$ (ii)$ the$ quid( pro( quo$ of$ exchange$ is$
accounted$ for$ by$ offers$ (understood$ as$ promises$with$ conditional$ content),$ and$ their$
acceptance:$A$conditionally$promises$to$φ$in$order$to$get(B(to$ψ,$and$B$ψFs$in$order$to$
get$A$ to$φ,$ (iii)$ the$ claims$and$obligations$ that$ arise$within$ exchanges$ are$ simply$ the$
promissory$claims$and$obligations$that$arise$from$any$promise.$
It$might$ be$ objected$ that$ the$ATE$ too$ comes$with$ its$ own$ gaps.$ First,$ one$might$
think$ that$a$key$ ingredient$missing$ from$the$ATE$ is$ trust.$To$accept$ Julie’s$offer,$Paul$
needs$to$trust$Julie’s$description$of$the$bike,$and$he$also$needs$to$trust$that$she$will$fulfil$




A$first$reason$for$this$ is$ that$ interpersonal$trust$may$not$always$be$necessary.$Perhaps$
Paul$ does$ not$ trust$ Julie,$ who$ he$ considers$ to$ be$ very$ unreliable,$ but$ nevertheless$





Likewise,$ one$may$worry$ that$ the$ATE$neglects$ another$ core$ aspect$of$ exchanges,$
namely,$their$various$degrees$of$voluntariness.$Often$a$preference$for$exchanging$exists$
only$ because$ one$ party$ in$ the$ exchange$ feels$ compelled$ to$ carry$ out$ the$ exchange,$
typically$because$of$ asymmetries$ in$bargaining$power.$Extreme$cases$are$ the$ soFcalled$
“offers$one$can’t$refuse”,$such$as$‘Your$money$or$your$life’.$Our$response$here,$again,$is$
that,$ in$the$same$way$that$a$theory$of$exchange$does$not$need$to$incorporate$the$preF
conditions$of$offers$ and$acceptances,$ a$ theory$of$ exchange$does$not$need$ to$elucidate$
the$ origin$ of$ the$ agents’$ preferences20.$ This$ way,$ the$ theory$ of$ exchange$ remains$
compatible$ with$ all$ the$ varieties$ of$ genetic$ explanations$ of$ agents’$ preferences,$ from$
coercion$ to$ autonomous$ deliberation.$ Correspondingly,$ the$ many$ normative$ issues$








modal$ logic$ to$ Paul$ in$ exchange$ for$ Paul’s$ playing$ the$ violin$ to$ her,$ no$ transfer$ ever$
takes$ place:$ the$ ATE$ takes$ services$ for$ what$ they$ are,$ actions,$ and$ does$ not$ need$ to$


















This$worry$ is$misguided.$Social$acts$ indeed$require$more$ than$one$ individual$—as$
opposed$ to$ solitary$actions,$ such$as$ intending,$grieving,$or$ running—$but$ they$do$not$







Value( subjectivism.( Another$ noted$ feature$ of$ the$ STE$ is$ its$ valueFneutrality:$
exchanges,$on$the$STE,$are$only$motivated$by$subjectiveFvaluations$of$ individuals,$and$
no$commitment$to$objective$values$is$required$to$account$for$exchanges.$One$might$fear$
that$ the$ ATE$ is,$ in$ contrast,$ too$ normative.$ Because$ each$ promise$ generates$ an$
obligation$ on$ the$ part$ of$ the$ promisor$ to$ keep$ his$ promise,$ and$ a$ claim$ to$ the$ same$
effect$on$the$part$of$the$promisee,$objective$norms$enter$the$scene.$After$the$offer,$the$
offeror$incurs$a$conditional$obligation$(A$has$the$obligation$to$transfer$x$if$B$transfers$y$
to( A),$ and$ the$ offeree$ has$ a$ conditional$ claim$ (B$ has$ a$ claim$ to$ the$ transfer$ of$x$ if$B$
transfers$y$to$A).$After$the$offeree’s$acceptance$these$norms$become$nonFconditional:$A$
has$the$nonFconditional$obligation$to$transfer$y$to$B,$and$B$a$nonFconditional$claim$to$
the$ same$ effect.$ All$ these$ norms$ are$ objective:$ neither$ figure$ within$ the$ scope$ of$ an$
attitude.$It$is$not$that$Julie$thinks$she$has$an$obligation;$she$really$has$one,$whether$she$
recognizes$ it$ or$ not.$ And$ the$ same$ hold$ for$ Paul’s$ claim.$ So,$ according$ to$ the$ ATE,$
exchanges$are$normsFladen$from$the$secondFstep$on.$
We$ submit$ that,$ while$ this$ is$ true,$ it$ is$ harmless.$ The$ crucial$ thing$ is$ that$ no$
normative$ assessment$ of( the( preferences( of( the( individuals( is$ involved$ in$ this$ picture.$
Nowhere$ is$ it$ claimed$ that$ individuals$ should$ prefer$ x$ to$ y,$ or$ that$ it$ would$ be$
(rationally,$ ethically,$ aesthetically…)$ better$ to$ prefer$ x$ to$ y.$ To$ the$ extent$ that$ an$




bike$ more$ than$ his$ money;$ Julie$ values$ Paul’s$ money$ more$ than$ her$ bike.$ Hence,$
exchanging$ the$ bike$ against$ the$ money$ would$ satisfy$ them$ both.$ Under$ the$ ATE,$
exchanges$are$also$mutually$beneficial,$but$for$a$rather$trivial$reason.$The$preferences$at$






mutually$ beneficial$ ex( ante,$ this$ is$ not$ essentially$ the$ case$ on$ the$ ATE,$ because$ the$
preferences$ that$ an$ exchange$ satisfies$ bear$ on$ the$ very$ actions$ constitutive$ of$ the$
exchange$ (there$ is$ not$ motivational$ gap).$ It$ is$ not$ because$ the$ exchangers$ expect$
(correctly$ or$ not)$ to$ be$ better$ off$ after$ the$ exchange$ that$ exchanges$ are$ mutually$
beneficial$ (although$ this$might$ also$ be$ the$ case);$more$ fundamentally,$ but$ also$more$
trivially,$ it$ is$ because$ the$ exchangers$ are$ willing$ to$ exchange$ that$ exchanges$ satisfy$
them.$$
Grammaticality.$Finally,$one$might$think$that,$contrary$to$the$STE,$the$ATE$achieves$




to$ entail$ an$ ungrammatical$ construal,$ where$ “exchange”$ functions$ (partly)$ as$ a$
connective$taking$sentences:$














argued$ that$ this$ strategy$ is$ doomed$ to$ failure.$ What$ should$ be$ done$ is$ exactly$ the$
opposite:$ consider$ exchanges$ of$ goods$ as$ a$ special$ case$ of$ exchanges$ of$ services.$ In$
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of$ Exchange$ (OTE).$ We$ show$ that,$ although$ the$ OTE$ fails$ to$ go$ far$ enough,$ it$ is$
nevertheless$on$ the$ right$ track.$According$ to$ it,$what$we$exchange$are$not$goods,$but$
ownership(of(goods22.$This$view$was$first$explicitly$put$forward$by$Commons$in$a$seminal$
paper:$$$
The$ soFcalled$ “exchange”$ of$ money,$ materials$ or$ services$ is$ not$ an$ exchange$ of$
physical$products$or$material$services,$as$assumed$by$the$classical$and$hedonistic$
economists.$ It$ is$ two$ transfers$ of$ two$ ownerships.$ The$ physical$ delivery$ occurs$
after$the$ownership$is$transferred$(Commons$1931,$p.$241,$fn$7).$
What$ we$ buy$ and$ sell$ is$ not$ material$ things$ and$ services$ but$ ownership$ of$
materials$and$services$(p.$242).$


















to$ this$ lesson,$ or$ to$ a$ lesson$ she$ would$ give$ on$ the$ basis$ of$what$ she$ learnt$ through$
Paul’s$lesson).$
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!












preferences$ it$must$rely$on$are$not$ inverse.$Because$ownership$ is$a$relation$between$a$
person$and$a$ thing,$ the$owner$has$ to$appear$ in$ the$content$of$ownership$preferences.$







is,$we$ submit,$ on$ the$ right$ track:$ the$ track$ away$ from$goods$ and$ inverse$ preferences.$
The$ view$ of$ exchange$ we$ have$ proposed$ goes$ further:$ on$ our$ view,$ what$ is$ basically$




























it$ in$ the$ context$ of$ an$ exchange$ (Walras$ 1874,$ lesson$ 5,$ §$ 41).$ In$ the$ terminology$we$
retain$here,$selling$a$good$amounts$to$transferring$it,$and$buying$a$good$amounts$to$this(
good(being(transferred(to(one,$again$in$the$context$of$an$exchange.$However,$since$each$
exchange$ involves$two$ transfers,$ this$proposal$entails$ that$each$exchange$contains$two$






These$ are$ quite$ unnatural$ things$ to$ say.$ Walras’$ concepts$ of$ purchase$ and$ sale$ are$
largely$ revisionary.$ If$ one$ is$ to$ maintain$ that$ in$ simple$ exchanges$ there$ is$ only$ one$
buyer,$and$one$seller,$one$needs$to$consider$the$two$other$accounts$of$the$distinction.$






the$ one$ who$ gives$ up$ nonFmonetary$ goods$ is$ called$ the$ seller.$ However,$ this$ is$ not$
always$ so,$we$ submit.$ First,$ the$ selling/purchasing$ asymmetry$ also$ arises$within$ nonF
monetary,$direct,$exchanges.$It$ is$possible$to$sell$apples$against$massages.$Second,$it$ is$
perfectly$fine$to$buy$some$money,$as$we$do$when$we$buy$some$foreign$currency$in$an$
exchange$ office.$ Despite$ appearances,$ the$ buying/selling$ asymmetry$ is$ therefore$ not$
essentially$ tied$to$the$use$of$money$or$other$means$of$exchange$(it$might$still$be$true$
that$ for$ reasons$ pertaining$ to$ the$ pragmatic$ of$ language$ we$ often$ use$ “selling”$ for$
“transferring$against$money”).$
(iii)$The$third$strategy,$ in$order$to$account$ for$the$selling/buying$distinction,$ is$ to$
appeal$ to$offers$—explicitly$ introduced$ in$ the$ATE$we$advocate.$On$ this$proposal,$ the(








One$problem$ for$ this$proposal,$however,$ is$ that$one$may$offer( to( purchase( or( buy(
something$to$somebody.$In$such$cases,$the$offeror$is$the$buyer.$
The$ strategy$ we$ favour,$ is$ a$ rather$ boring$mix$ of$ the$ second$ and$ third$ one.$ The$
concepts$of$selling$and$buying,$we$suggest,$are$ambiguous:$in$one$sense,$buying$means$
getting$a$good$(or$being$render$a$service)$against$some$money;$in$another$sense$buying$
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